Saturday, February 29, 2020

Chamber Of Commerce CEO Tom Donohue Made $4.7 Million In 2010

https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/chamber-commerce-tom-donohue-salary-compensation_n_1097375?ri18n=true
Tom Donohue, the president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, made a record $4.7 million last year, at a time when the rest of the country was seeing high unemployment and falling wages.

Donohue's pay package included a $3.6 million bonus. His compensation in 2010 was $1 million higher than it was in 2009, when he was the sixth-highest paid lobbyist in the country.

In March, Donohue made headlines for saying that the compensation of public workers is "over bloated" and their pensions are "out of control."

Donohue's compensation was revealed in the Chamber's 990 tax forms, which became publicly available this week. The Chamber itself also did quite well in 2010, collecting a significant number of million-dollar donations.

According to information compiled by the group U.S. Chamber Watch, the business lobby received at least $189 million in dues from 1,511 members, including corporations, individuals and organizations. Eighty-eight percent of those donations were for $100,000 or more, and 53 percent of the members donated $1 million or more. The Chamber also received two contributions that were each in excess of $10 million.

On its website, the Chamber boasts that it represents "3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors and regions," more than 96 percent of which are "small businesses with 100 employees or fewer." A significant amount of its funding, however, appears to come from a relatively small number of entities.

"The U.S. Chamber is an organization that's made up of the one percent, to advocate for the one percent, said Christy Setzer, spokeswoman for Chamber Watch. "That's reflected in every aspect of the Chamber's operations, from the nearly $5 million compensation package received by their president, Tom Donohue, to the policies for the wealthy that they've taken their biggest stances on -- including their support for extending the Bush tax cuts and a tax 'holiday' on overseas profits. That may be cool comfort to big corporate CEOs, but hardly helpful to struggling Mom and Pop shops across America."

The Chamber did not return a request for comment.

HACKSAW RIDGE - Movie Review


The true story of Desmond T. Doss (Andrew Garfield), who won the Congressional Medal of Honor despite refusing to bear arms during WWII on religious grounds. Directed by Mel Gibson.

Thursday, February 27, 2020

Russian space sector plagued by astronomical corruption

https://phys.org/news/2019-05-russian-space-sector-plagued-astronomical.html
With millions of dollars missing and officials in prison or fleeing the country, Russia's space sector is at the heart of a staggering embezzlement scheme that has dampened ambitions of recovering its Soviet-era greatness.

For years, Moscow has tried to fix the industry that was a source of immense pride in the USSR. While it has bounced back from its post-Soviet collapse and once again become a major world player, the Russian space sector has recently suffered a series of humiliating failures.

And now, massive corruption scandals at state space agency Roscosmos have eclipsed its plans to launch new rockets and lunar stations.

"Billions (of rubles) are being stolen there, billions," Alexander Bastrykin, the powerful head of Russia's Investigative Committee—Russia's equivalent of the FBI—said in mid-May.

Investigations into corruption at Roscosmos have been ongoing "for around five years and there is no end in sight," he added.

In the latest controversy, a senior space official appears to have fled Russia during an audit of the research centre he headed.

Yury Yaskin, the director of the Research Institute of Space Instrumentation, left Russia for a European country in April where he announced his resignation, the Kommersant paper reported.

He feared the discovery of malpractice during an inspection of the institute, according to the newspaper's sources.

Roscosmos confirmed to AFP that Yaskin had resigned but did not clarify why. His Moscow institute is involved in developing the Russian satellite navigation system GLONASS designed to compete with the American GPS system.

Stopping corruption 'primary goal'

Corruption has particularly affected Russia's two most important space projects of the decade: GLONASS and the construction of the country's showpiece cosmodrome Vostochny, built to relieve Moscow's dependence on Baikonur in ex-Soviet Kazakhstan.

Almost all major companies in the sector, including rocket builders Khrunichev and Progress, have been hit by financial scandals that have sometimes led to prison sentences for large-scale fraud.

Russia's Audit Chamber, a parliamentary body of financial control, said financial violations at Roscosmos in 2017 stood at 760 billion rubles (around $11.7 billion), accounting for nearly 40 percent of the total irregularities in the entire economy that year.

Roscosmos told AFP that "eradicating corruption" is one of its "primary goals", adding that it regularly cooperates with investigations by the authorities.

In mid-April, President Vladimir Putin stressed the need to "progressively resolve the obvious problems that slow down the development of the rocket-space sector."

"The time and financial frameworks to realise space projects are often unjustified," the Russian leader said.

More money, more corruption

Rebooting the space sector is a matter of prestige for the Kremlin. It symbolises its renewed pride and ability to be a major global power, especially in the context of increased tensions with the United States.

Almost destroyed in the 1990s, the sector stayed afloat thanks to foreign commercial contracts.

But independent space expert Vitaly Yegorov told AFP there were still "executives of a very high professional level" at that time and fewer accidents during launches.

The first module of the International Space Station (ISS), Zarya, was manufactured in Russia and launched in 1998 despite a major financial crisis at the time.

Paradoxically, the situation deteriorated in the early 2000s, when the Russian economy was growing. The influx of public funds fuelled fraud, and space research stopped advancing, experts say.

"Today, the space sector works like this: give us money and we will launch something—one day," Yegorov said.

Only the ISS continues to be "an unshakeable ivory tower", he said, since it plays a "political role" aimed at maintaining international cooperation.

Analysts say Roscosmos chief Dmitry Rogozin, a former deputy prime minister known for his anti-Western statements, is struggling to deal with the industry's problems.

Russia's scientific community has criticised Rogozin, who is a journalism graduate, for his lack of knowledge of the space sector.

"He probably would have made an excellent spokesman for Roscosmos," joked Yegorov, adding: "Even Superman could not handle this avalanche of problems."

Cosmic Voyage (1936)


Cosmic Voyage or The Space Voyage (Russian: Космический рейс, romanized: Kosmicheskiy reys: Fantasticheskaya novella) is a 1936 Soviet science fiction film produced by Mosfilm. It was one of the earliest films to represent a realistic spaceflight, including weightlessness.

Kosmicheskiy reys: Fantasticheskaya novella was initially conceived in 1924 by Russian filmmaker Vasili Zhuravlov, but it was not pursued for production until 1932, when Komsomol (the Communist Union of Youth) recommended the creation of film that would spur an interest in space studies. Zhuravlov consulted with Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the noted aeronautical theorist and rocket science engineer, on the screenplay. Tsiolkovsky died shortly after the film was completed.

Two spaceships in the film were named after the Soviet leaders Joseph Stalin and Kliment Voroshilov. The film's cosmonauts enter liquid-filled chambers to buffer the impact of takeoff and landing, and they communicate their landing to the Earth by spelling out "CCCP" (the Russian-language acronym for "USSR") with reflective substances spread across the lunar surface.

Tuesday, February 25, 2020

Steven Jones Continues to Demo Truth Movement

https://nomadiceveryman.blogspot.com/2019/09/steven-jones-continues-to-demo-truth.html
Back in 2003 the RJ Lee Group was contracted by Deutsche Bank to do a study to identify signature markers of the dust created by the destruction of the World Trade Centers on Sept. 11th 2001.

Apparently the new owners of the Trade Centers or their insurance company didn’t want to pay for the cleaning of the dust and the damage to the Deutsche Bank building at 130 Liberty Street, New York. So Deutsche Bank paid the RJ Lee Group to prove that the dust and damage to their building did indeed come from the event at the World Trade Center that day. The report was titled WTC Dust Signature Report Composition and Morphology. Who was to know that the key evidence of the demolition of the Trade Centers would turn up in that report.

“Various metals (most notably iron and lead) were melted during the WTC Event, producing spherical metallic particles. Exposure of phases to high heat results in the formation of spherical particles due to surface tension. Figure 21 and Figure 22 show a spherical iron particle resulting from the melting of iron (or steel).”  2003 RJ Lee Group report page 17

“In addition to the spherical iron and aluminosilicate particles, a variety of heavy metal particles including lead, cadmium, vanadium, yttrium, arsenic, bismuth, and barium particles were produced by the pulverizing, melting and/or combustion of the host materials such as solder, computer screens, and paint during the WTC Event. Combustion-related products are significant WTC Dust Markers, particularly if seen in combination. However, it is worth noting that fly ash and partially combusted products can occur in trace concentrations in ordinary building dusts, but not in the concentrations observed in WTC Dust.”  2003 RJ Lee Group page 19

“The differences within the WTC Dust and typical background dusts include the fineness and evidence of heat, the size and concentration of the chrysotile, and the length and concentration of the mineral wool and other fibers, as well as the frequency of occurrence of spherical particles produced by fire and heat, char and soot, and other building products.”  2003 RJ Lee Group report page 19-20

What the RJ Lee Group found was that MANY types of heavy metals and plastics were melted instantly under great pressure during the event of 9/11 and that the evidence showed that this was due to a combustion event similar to an explosion. This kind of heat, this kind of pressure, could not have existed in the readily accepted Bazant “crush down crush up” theory. Key to the formation of these micro-spheres of molten metal is that they would have had to have been formed in space so that the surface tension would form them into spherical shapes. That means that they weren’t crushed or pulverized into these shapes, but rather massive amounts of heat and pressure were generated and the molten metal results were then formed via surface tension while they were then free floating in space.

This was then and still is now one of the strongest piece of scientific evidence which clearly disproves the official, gravity driven hypothesis of the events of 9/11.

The end result of that study should have been that it was taken up by dedicated researchers and scientists of the Truth movement and expanded upon and it would have been if BYU, an ultra-conservative university in Utah which gave Dick Cheney an honorary doctorate of Public Service degree in 2007, hadn’t paid Dr. Steven Jones to mislead the Truth movement for years about those findings. Ironically (or maybe not so much so) it was right around the same time that BYU also honored Dr. Jones by raising his status at BYU to that of Professor Emeritus.

When Cheney received his honorary doctorate, he also gave the Commencement address to the class of 2007 at BYU. This was part of his opening:

“…And it’s always an honor to be in the company of this university’s chairman, a distinguished American and recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, Gordon B. Hinckley.” Dick Cheney, 2007

Gordon B. Hinckley, spiritual leader of the Mormon religion, had an interesting quote back in 2003 which I think is extremely relevant   to this topic.

“It may even be that [the Lord] will hold us responsible if we try to impede or hedge up the way of those who are involved in a contest with forces of evil and repression.”  Gordon B. Hinckley, 2003

How could it be that BYU would pay Steven Jones to conduct research into “super secret military grade explosives” like “nanothermite”, pay for at least two other researchers to do the work at BYU, have the head of that department “peer review” his paper, and pay for the publication of such a paper in a vanity press like Bentham Publishing? The Chairman of the school and spritual leader of their religon had made it clear that the Lord wanted good Mormons to HELP Dick Cheney and George W. Bush, not “impede” them.

The only logical answer, given what we now know about their “nanothermite” paper, is that from the start Dr. Jones was in fact helping Dick Cheney and George W. Bush by distracting the Truth movement away from the valuable evidence exposed in the RJ Lee Group report from the very beginning.

Since that time, Dr. Jones has behaved in some rather disappointing ways, ways I believe are designed to discredit the Truth movement from within.

1. Prof. Jones refused to test for residues of high explosives in the WTC dust even though he repeated claims that NIST should have done just that.

2. Prof. Jones embarrassed Richard Gage at his press conference for AE911Truth by bringing up “earthquake weapons” in front of the assembled press corp at the reception.

3. Prof. Jones has repeatedly encouraged Truth advocates to listen to Glenn Beck’s show stating that Beck was “getting better”

4. Prof. Jones has been trying to instruct Truth movement activists as to what they should and shouldn’t say about the Truth movement and his “peer reviewed” paper.

5. Prof. Jones will now be headlining with “Master Witches and Hyper Intuitives” at Conspiracy Con.

As if that wasn’t bad enough, Prof. Jones is now over at 9/11 Blogger still pushing his “nanothermite”  distraction but he is also incorporating his “earthquake weapons” and “free energy” research into the mix as well.

It is certainly not a coincidence that Judy Wood, another fake truth advocate who promoted the “dustification” theory and “ray beams from space”, also promoted “free energy” research for many years and her recent book with an embarrassingly  stupid title also incorporates “free energy” research right there on the cover.

Jesse Ventura also just recently showed his true colors by claiming on Alex Jones’ show that the towers were not brought down by controlled demolition but rather by “ray beams from space” while a woman who sounded a lot like Judy Wood fed him lines during the interview.

So it would seem that the planned implosion of the Truth movement is going to center around on of it’s most obvious and ridiculous fake “truthers”, Judy Wood. With Ventura and Jones now channeling the dustification lady with just a few months to go before the 10th anniversary of 9/11 and the staged killing of Osama bin Laden, it would seem that the stage is being set for our targeted assassination.

This shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone paying attention. Judy Wood and Steven Jones started out together in the Truth movement. Seems they will finish together as well. Let’s just hope they don’t finish us as well in the process.

Check out the Judy Wood interview that makes her perfect Weapon of Mass Destruction for the Truth movement. If people start to associate this bullshit with us, we are truly done for.  The fact that Steven Jones actually created an organization called “Scholars” for 9/11 Truth with this idiot, should tell us a lot about why he got into the Truth movement to start with.

How Not to Start an Interview


A host mixes up John Cusack with Kevin Spacey

Friday, February 21, 2020

History of the pre-Revolutionary Origins of the USSR

http://www.carrollquigley.net/Lectures/history-of-the-pre-revolutionary-origins-of-the-ussr-lecture.htm
SPEAKER--Dr. Carroll Quigley, Professor of History,
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

We might say that the mother of Russia was the Byzantine civilization, the great civilization of the Roman Empire in the East, centered around the Capital City of Byzantium. You will recall that the Western Empire ceased to exist about 476 A. D., but the Eastern Empire continued for almost another thousand years, until 1453. During that thousand-year period of Byzantine history, it adopted certain characteristics which are not found in the Western Empire and certainly not found in western culture. It is that Byzantine empire which is the mother of Russia.

But Russia’s father was the Vikings. In Russian history they are generally known as the Varangians. That is to say, about the year 800 or so, the Northmen, whom we know as the Vikings, were spreading out from Norway and Sweden in every direction. You will recall perhaps that they are supposed to have come out from this area to Iceland, through Greenland, even to North America. They established Normandy in 911. They invaded England under Canute. Eventually they came down and established the great kingdom of Sicily about the year 1050 or so and a little later they established the Norman kingdom of Syria.

Now these Vikings are the fathers of Russia, and they came into Russia through the great river valleys of European Russia. These two, fitting together the Byzantine tradition and the Viking tradition, were what created Russia. From the Byzantine they obtained autocracy, that is the concept of the state as an absolute power, the concept of the state as a totalitarian authority, and a union of church and state. They received the belief that the religious system should be a department of the government; that there is a divergence between the state and the people; that the people are to be ruled by a separate and distinct authority; the concept that the state is primarily the private property of a semidivine ruler.

Now these characteristics, which are sometimes called Byzantine, were derived from the Byzantine civilization as it came into Russia in the period from about 850 onward. What were those? Autocracy, totalitarian state, union of church and state, a divergence between state and people, a concept of the state as the private property of a semidivine ruler. Those characteristics we find pretty much in Russia today. They were also found in the Byzantine Empire. From the Vikings, from the fathers who came for a short visit and they went away, they received militarism, the love of booty, a belief that a way of life could be made out of war and piracy. You see, these Northmen who went out in this way went out to conquer, to seize booty, to make slaves, to impose tribute on conquered peoples, and to make out of this a way of life. That was the Viking way of life. Now this is the basic background of the Russian tradition. I want to very briefly contrast it to the tradition of the West.

Back in the year 100, let us say, the great civilization was that represented by the Roman Empire. We call it the classical civilization. The Roman Empire was in the basin of the Mediterranean.

It always had a tendency to break into halves, the Latin half and the Greek half. The western half, the Latin half, of the Roman Empire ceased to exist, it was the Greek half, the eastern half, which continued to exist. Now the fact that the Western Empire disappeared and yet the western society continued is of the utmost importance because the people of the West discovered that the state and society are not the same thing; that you can live without a public authority; that the state is a different thing from society. This becomes the basis for what we call western liberalism, that is, that it is possible to have a way of life without direct intervention and supervision of the state. The belief that the state is a crowning but not essential cap to the social structure is a western belief. The belief that economic life and religious life can exist and should exist without state intervention and the belief that men have rights which are not derived from public authority, those are western ideas.

From this came much of European history, such as the conflicts of church and state. A conflict of church and state would be impossible in the Byzantine world or in Russia because they cannot conceive of a religious society and a church existing separate and independent from the state. We can, because the church existed in western Europe for hundreds of years, yet there was no state--in what we call the feudal period. Similarly in our society we have laissez faire. Now laissez faire means that economic life should run more or less on its own. “No government in business,” we say. That is the western idea. It is a very strange idea to the Russians. They have never had an economic life which was not largely dominated by the state, and before that, their mother, the Byzantine civilization, had very little economic life which was not dominated by the state.

Next in the west we have what we call the individual’s natural rights, that human beings have rights as human beings. That is, they have rights which are not necessarily granted to them by some superior authority. In the East they don’t have that. In the East they cannot really conceive of people having any rights except those which are granted by the State. Thus the idea of natural rights, which is an essential part of our tradition, is almost completely lacking in their tradition.

The last point is that we have a concept in the western tradition which we call the rule of law. That means that society, religious life, economic life, and so forth, have certain rules which are intrinsic in themselves. You find out what those rules are by observing them. How does economic life function? Those are principles of economics. How does religious life function? Those are the principles of religion, and so on. Thus we believe that there are laws and rules which are independent and separate from the state and we even may have the idea that the state should be under the law.

Now they don't have that at all in Russia. The idea that the state should be under the law is completely strange to their tradition. When we talk about it, they think we are hypocrites, and yet it is an essential part of our tradition. The distinction which I am trying to emphasize here is a distinction which is derived very largely from the fact that the Russian tradition was derived from the Byzantine civilization.

In Russia the state dominated everything. The church was a department of the government. The Russian idea was that the state was above the law, above the church; was the source of all rights; was the source of all prosperity; was the source of all security and all justice. These concepts were imported into Russia from the only political structure they knew, that is the Byzantine civilization. The Byzantine Empire was the only great civilization they knew. They were dazzled by it, being a barbaric people, and they attempted to copy it.

That appears very clearly in one story we are told. One of the old Russian rulers, about the year 900 or so, decided they should have a religion. After all, this barbaric superstition they had wasn’t satisfactory, and he sent reporters out to examine the basic religions, that of Israel, the Byzantine, and the Latin church of the west. When they came back he examined their reports and decided they should become Orthodox Christians, that is, they should adopt the religion of the Byzantine civilization. We have a description written by the reporters in that case and it is perfectly clear how dazzled they were because the first thing that impressed them was they went to the Cathedral of San Sofia, which is in Constantinople. They describe how they were dazzled by the mosaics, by the candles, by the incense--by the whole impression. Now this dazzling by the Cathedral of San Sofia is repeated in every aspect of their culture. They copied, not just the religion, they copied the alphabet, the way of writing. The Russian alphabet is copied, you can see very clearly, from the Greek-Byzantine.

Now this fact that the Russians copied Byzantine civilization and did it very consciously in their religion, in their writing, in their state, in their laws, and various other things, even in their literature to a certain extent--was intensified by the fact that in Russia the rulers were always outsiders. These rulers innovated all of the political, religious, and economic life. There was no state. Foreigners brought it in. The Vikings established it. There was no religion. It was imported from Byzantium wholesale and imposed on the people. Their economic life was at the very lowest level, that is, it was largely living off the forest, a forest economy with hunting and rudimentary agriculture. On this there was imposed by the Vikings an advanced economy or a world trading system. That is, the Vikings were trading from Byzantium up across Russia to Sweden.

So we have, then, that in Russia the rulers were outsiders. The rulers were the originators of their political, religious, and economic life. But there is something else and this, I think, is perhaps the most important thing. Russia was in very exposed political position. It was caught between the pressure of Asiatic populations pushing westward from these great open spaces and the pressure of western technology pushing eastward. By western technology I mean the scientific discoveries of the West, such as gunpowder and firearms, systems of counting, systems of public finance and budgets--things of that kind. In a moment I will explain exactly what I mean by that.

If you take this Byzantine tradition, add to it the fact that in Russia you had a forest-dwelling, agricultural people with a foreign military group imposed upon them, and then add to that the third fact that this dualistic society was caught between a population pressure and a technology pressure, you get then the structure which became Russia. Russia became a foreign barracks structure, superimposed on a Slav agricultural population and it remains that pretty much to this day. All Of that was by way of introduction. That is summing up what I am going to say.

Now very briefly I want to look at geography and chronology. Geography and chronology are the basis of history. The geography of Russia is quite simple. It is the western end of a great open plain. That is simple enough. But more than that, the eastern end of that plain has been drying, drying, drying. There is inadequate rainfall. There is a desert in Asia which has been spreading for many hundreds of years. I will come back to that in a moment when I discuss chronology. Let us finish the geography. In this geographical structure there are three belts in Russia, the central belt, we call the forest belt; north of that, the tundra--a flat, frosty, plain; south of it, the steppes--a flat plain. Now each of those three is divided into two. I won't bother with the tundra. That is divided into two. The forest belt is divided into two--the northern forest belt of evergreens and the southern forest belt of deciduous trees--they drop their leaves in the fall. The steppes are divided into two—the southern part of the steppes is a salty plain that is practically useless; the northern part of the steppes is the famous black-earth region, very rich in agricultural soil.

The reason I mention this geography is because if we draw a line between the steppes and the forest, we are drawing a line between two economic worlds. The forest world is to the north of this line, and the line runs just south of Moscow. The forest world has an inadequate food supply, but a more than adequate supply of wood, building materials, fuel, and such. The steppes to the south, that is the black-earth region, has a surplus of food since it is among the great cereal-producing regions of the world but has a tremendous deficiency in fuel and building materials. Obviously there is going to be interchange, the interchange of food moving north into the forest and the forest supplies, which include, in addition to fuel and wood, such things as honey from the bees, skins, hides--things of that kind. You get that interchange. That is the geographic pattern in regard to the lay of the land and it leads to an economic interchange between the steppes, the black-earth region, and the deciduous forest.

Then we impose on the western end of that structure the river system. Russia in the western end has a marvelous river system. As you move from near Smolensk, you will find rivers going in all four principal directions. There are at least two great rivers which go to the Black Sea--the Dnieper and the Don. One great river goes to the Caspian Sea, the Volga. There are other rivers which go up to the White Sea; another river that goes up to the Baltic Sea. This means, then, that you have a river system running vertical across agricultural zones running horizontal. This means that the political center of Russia should be--if only geographical factors were looked at-right about where Smolensk is, because Smolensk is halfway between the north and the south. It is in a position where you can easily reach all four rivers which will take you to any one of the four bodies of water, and it is just about where the steppes, with its surplus of food, joins with the forest, with its surplus of wood and fuel. Thus Smolensk, you see, is in a very commanding position.

As a matter of fact, the political center of Russia isn’t at Smolensk. It is at Moscow, and it is northeast of Smolensk. Why is it that the center for political reasons is north and east of where it would have been for geographic and economic reasons? The reason is those pressures I mentioned before; the pressures of population coming this way came up at Smolensk from the southeast. At the same time, the technology pressures of the West, coming in this way, made it necessary to retreat from Smolensk. Smolensk, which is the geographic center of this system, was under Polish control for long periods. Moscow became the center politically because it was in the forest where the barbarians coming out from the steppes couldn’t easily reach it. It was in the backwoods territory of the Volga. Now the invaders from the East came up the Volga, but they didn’t bother going up that little tributary, the Moscow River. Thus Moscow became the center, and Moscow became the center in the period we call the Moscovite period of Russian history.

The political chronology of Russian history can be examined. A much more important chronology, and that is the one I want to speak about, is this:

Central Asia has been getting drier and drier for almost 2,000 Years. As a result the population has been pressing westward for almost 2,000 years. And yet it doesn’t press westward any more. Why? The reason is the technological advance of western Europe.

European technology began to rise very, very rapidly since perhaps the year 1200 or 1250. By the year 1600, European technology had risen so high that Europe began, for technological reasons, to push into Asia and to stop the population pressure based on geographical reasons from coming out. And, as a result, beginning about 1600 Europeans began to move into Asia everywhere. They went down into India; they went into China; they went into Japan. They were doing that for technological reasons, because a few Europeans with firearms could overcome great masses of Asiatics who didn’t have firearms. Europeans had a good system of communications, for instance, a marvelous alphabet, a good system of counting. Our system of counting is a marvelous thing. With all these great technological advances, Europe put a terrific pressure on Asia and the turning point, that is, the breaking point of Russian Chronology is about the year 1600. That is why Russia came into existence about the year 1600 in what is called the Moscovite period.

Before I leave this technology I want to point out one obvious thing. The turning point between the period of Asiatic population pressure moving westward and European technology pressures moving eastward is about the year 1600, but there is obviously another turning point in the future, is there not?

That would be the turning point when Asia gets western technology, because if Asia ever gets western technology and combines population pressure outward with a western technology, it will reverse the system. No longer will you have European pressure moving into Asia. You will, at that future date, have Asiatic pressures moving this way. That is the point we are rapidly approaching, a point where the pressure of population in this area will be combined with a European, westernized technology--the gasoline engine, telephone, telegraph, wireless, and so forth, rapid communications, rapid transportation, and of course western firearms and western methods of military procedures. When those are combined in this area, you will have again a pressure outward. We have almost reached that point, it seems to me. Now you have an outline, I believe, of Russian history. I am going to run through it very rapidly, take these basic concepts, which I think I have given to you, and try to tie them into the history of Russia.

The first period of Russian history we call Ancient Russia. It lasted until about 878. In that period of Ancient Russia you have a forest area inhabited in the east by Finns, in the west by Slavs. You do not include the steppes because the population pressure on the steppes makes it untenable for European people. Here you have the Slav slowly moving through the forest, mixing with and replacing the Finns who were there in the forest. That is the period we call Ancient Russia, and it is an economy of hunting and rudimentary agriculture. There is no commerce, and there is no industry. As the Slavs moved eastward, they pushed northward more and more because of the pressure from the steppes. The wild horsemen galloping out of Asia kept hitting them, but if they stayed in the forest they were hard to hit. These tribes of horsemen on horseback had bows and arrows, but they could function only on the steppes. Accordingly, the Slavs moved through the forest eastward. That is Ancient Russia, a period of 100 years in which relatively little happened.

Then, in about 830, the Vikings came in. The Vikings came in as fighting people concerned in their minds with getting booty and trade. They made no distinction between these two. These Varangians, or Vikings, came down among these forest people, or the Slavs, and set up a line of traffic from Byzantium up the Dnieper, then up various other rivers to Lake Lagoda, and then to the Baltic Sea. They brought in the idea of the state; they brought in commerce, which didn’t exist before; and they began to change this Savage tribal wooded condition into a state.

That leads us to the second period of Russian history, the Kievan period, because the city of Kiev became the political center of these Varangians or Vikings. I have down here in the Kiev period that it lasted approximately from 878 to 1237. And the essence of it was the Novgorod-Smolensk-Kiev water route. That is the trade route from the Baltic to the Black Sea, of which the west bastions were at Novgorod in the extreme North, Smolensk at the middle, and Kiev in the South, near the Black Sea. For a number of years the Vikings had in the South a foreign commercial system imposed as private property on a Slavic agricultural population. In this period they became converted to Byzantine-0rthodox, Greek Christianity. There were raids from the steppes still continuing and eventually these raids, by driving far enough west, captured Kiev and destroyed this commercial system.

That brings us to the next period of Russian history, the Mongol period, because the greatest of these raiders from the steppes were the Mongols, or, as the Russians generally called them, the Tartars.

About 1206 under Genghis Khan they began to conquer from Central Asia to every point that they could reach. When they conquered an area, they imposed tribute on it. They were relatively few in numbers, very warlike, and they traveled with terrific speed. Each man had three or four horses and shifted from horse to horse. They traveled for days at a time without getting off. They ate on the horses, and the story is that they even slept on their horses. They hit and ran. They never could be pinned down, and eventually they conquered much of this area. In fact in 1241 they reached Genoa. They got deep into central Europe. However, they fell back but continued to hold Russia. This is, accordingly, the Mongol period of Russian history.

What it means is that you have a foreign exploiting system still imposed over the Slav people. Earlier it had been the

Varangians; now the Mongols, still foreigners, still exploiters, still militaristic. It was in this Mongol period that Moscow began to rise. Moscow rose for several reasons. I have already indicated it was in the forest area. Thus it was relatively safe. Second, it was on a tributary of the Volga. The Mongols did go up the Volga, but they rarely went up that tributary which went too far west. There were other accidental reasons. In Moscow the ruling family had sous who grew to maturity before their fathers died. Now that is just an accident. It was not until 1425 that there was any dispute about the succession in Moscow. In these other cities where there were still remnants of the Vikings, they were now almost pure Slav through intermarriage. When the Vikings came in, they didn’t bring their women with them. They married Slav women. Accordingly, as their children grew up, they grew up under Slav training because their mothers were Slavs, and they became practically pure Slav in blood. They had Slavic minds, but they still had the Viking attitude, that is a foreign group imposed on the Slavs and wresting all they could out of them in tribute.

As Moscow began to rise in this way, the decisive factor probably was that the Mongols made the princes of Moscow their chief tribute collectors for all of Russia. Thus the princes of Moscow went out everywhere and in the name of the Mongols collected tribute. This continued for hundreds of years. Moscow became what we might call the representative of the Mongols in Russia. The supremacy which Moscow has exercised since over Russia is very largely that kind of supremacy, a supremacy based on a tribute collector, a foreign, remote, conquering state to whom the people felt no real allegiance and toward which they gave what they had to give. It was Ivan the First who was made the exclusive tribute collector for the Mongols for all of Russia. A little later the Mongols made a court of highest appeal in Moscow. So now not only was money flowing to Moscow, but all justice on cases of appeal was flowing to Moscow.

In 1380 Dimitri Donskoi won a great victory over the Mongols on the Don River, and was given the surname of Donskoi. What this indicates is that Russia was shifting from a Mongol period to a Moscow period, because the princes of Moscow were supporting the resistance against the Mongols, and it means when the Mongols are gone, Moscow will still be there.

That brings us to the third period of Russian history, the Muscovite period. This was the period in which pressure from western technology and pressure from eastern populations met and together hammered out Russia as a military machine superimposed upon the Slav population. The poverty of the people made the possession of firearms an exclusive state prerogative. Only the state had firearms and the state could maintain its firearms only by fiscal pressure on the people. Thus, you have fiscalism. This fiscalism so drained the wealth from the people that they were never able to get firearms, so firearms remained the exclusive prerogative of the government. The populations didn’t have firearms; they couldn’t get them; there was a continuation of the Mongol tribute. The result was autocracy. The peasants were subject to the landlords and thus you got serfdom. This was the period in which serfdom was created. The landlords were given this power over their serfs so that the landlords would be able to fight. Thus you get a military machine because the landlords were allied with Moscow.

That brings us to the next period. The next period of Russian history is the Imperial period. I have listed some of the great leaders of that period of Imperial Russia beginning with Peter the Great. Peter the Great attempted to westernize Russia, but every effort he made to westernize Russia merely meant he was establishing more firmly that government which was alien to the Slavic people because he was not westernizing the Slav people.

The pressure from the West came from Sweden and Poland largely. They both disappeared. The year 1750 marked the decline of Sweden and Poland, also the decline of tyranny. Thus Russia was given a moment of relief in which, using westernized technology of a very rudimentary character, it was able to impose its supremacy on the peoples to the East. Once the population pressure from the East decreased, the peasants of Russia began to pour eastward and by 1650 they had reached the Pacific. The government made every effort to stop that movement of the peasants, because only if the peasants remained to work the land of the landlords could the landlords maintain the military structure of the society which they thought was necessary. Ultimately the government followed the peasants and thus it was that Russia got this Asiatic terrain by following the movement of the peasants eastward.

Once the pressure from the East was off, Russia became Moscow-domination over the Slav people. The pressure from the West had also declined. Then the Russian Government began to have a bad conscience toward its own people. In addition to that, it still wanted to westernize them. When these two fitted together, the desire to westernize and the bad conscience toward the people, it produced reform, but when the people claimed things, it produced reaction. So there was reform, reaction, reform, reaction. In addition to having a bad conscience toward its own people in this period, the government had an inferiority complex toward the West, something which I think it still has.

After this rapid survey of Russian history I have listed four conclusions. First, the whole period of Russian history shows bad government toward the people; the government is above the law; in fact many segments of the population, such as the peasants, are even outside the law and have almost no law or judicial system to which to appeal. There is corruption and violence in the government itself. It is an irresponsible kind of system.

The third conclusion concerns the nature of the people. The nature of the Russian people is quite different from the nature of the government. The Russian people have terrific potentialities. They are patient; they are long-suffering; they are moody. On the whole, they are pacifists. They want to be left alone. They are devious. They don't tell the truth generally because they think if they tell the truth it may lead to more pressures on them—taxes will be increased or something. They are indifferent to humanity. They have suffered too long. That is the third conclusion.

The fourth conclusion is that there is a danger of antithesis between reform and reaction. If the Russians don’t reform, they are a threat to our culture because they are not western, but if they reform and become westernized, then they become a threat to us because if they become westernized and adopt our technology, they become more able to wreck us or even impose their wills on us. That is, if they don’t reform they are a threat culturally; if they do reform, they are a threat politically. It is an important fact that material culture and western technology will spread to the East faster than will our western ideologies, western ideas, laws, ethics, anything of that kind. That ends my lecture. Naturally I went a little over the time, but I covered it.

The Untold Truth Of The Red Ring Of Death


When you think back to Microsoft's earlier gaming endeavors, you might remember the original Xbox console: the first home of Halo and the launch platform for Xbox Live. Or you may remember the Xbox 360, which brought us the Gears of War franchise and one of the longest console lifespans in recent memory. Speaking of lifespans, it also introduced us to a certain dreaded Red Ring...

Saturday, February 15, 2020

Correcting RedandBlackRevoltuionary on History

The Development of the Soviet Economy

http://www.carrollquigley.net/Lectures/the-development-of-the-soviet-economy-lecture.htm
SPEAKER--Dr. Carroll Quigley, Professor of History,
25 March 1953

The Marxist ideology you are probably familiar with. I merely want to run through certain items in it. These were in the minds of the Bolsheviks when they came to power. First, the Marxist ideology assumes what they call dialectic materialism.

That is, they assume that what happens is the result of conflict, dialectic conflict, and you get an outcome from that conflict. The materialism side of that indicates that the basic struggle is on the material level, and what happens on that material level determines what the structure of society will be like on other levels, such as the religious, political, the ideological, literature, science, and so forth. So they have, then, dialectic materialism.

The second factor that they had in their minds was class struggle. “All history is the history of class struggle,” said Marx. Third, they believed that the state is a class organization of power, for all history is the history of class struggle. They said that the history of the state has always been the history of an upper class dominating and exploiting a lower class. So the state, then, is a class organization.

Fourth, they believed that there would be an inevitable revolution, that, as a result of the class struggle, the rich, as Marx said, would get richer and richer, and fewer and fewer in numbers, while the exploited proletariat would become more and more numerous, and poorer and poorer; and that if this continued, inevitably they would reach a point where there would be very few rich and a very large number of the exploited, and it would be very simple for the exploited to take over from the few rich; so there inevitably would be a revolution.

The fifth assumption of the Marxist ideology is that this would be followed by a dictatorship of the proletariat; namely, the proletariat as the result of the inevitable revolution having taken over the control of the economic system and of the instruments of production of the state, they would have to have a period of dictatorship in which they would change the other levels of society to correspond with the new Communist economic structure. So they would have to get, then, a Communist political system, a Communist school system, a Communist religious system, a communist ideological system, and so forth; and that, would require a dictatorship.

Lastly, when they finally had the whole thing set up so that in all levels of society they had a Communist society, there would no longer be any need of a state. This is the sixth aspect of this Marxist ideology, that the ultimate outcome would be the Communist society, a Communist society in which there were no groups exploiting anyone else and, accordingly, there would be no need of a state—a kind of glorified Garden of Eden anarchy.

This Marxist ideology was in the minds of the Bolsheviks when they took over.

The second factor which influenced what happened was the past history of Russia itself. Here I am going to sum that up in three words, which means it is very much falsified. First, the economy of Russia was “backward”; second, it was "exploitative”; and third, it was “state-dominated”, in 1917 and for a long period before 1917. When I say that the economy of Russia was “backward” when the Bolsheviks arrived on the scene, I mean that it was very largely agricultural, and that it was a poor agriculture, not a productive or advanced agriculture.

The Bolsheviks had commerce, but it was not so dominant as it is in an advanced society, and they had relatively very little industry. Their agriculture was extensive rather than intensive. For example, they still used a three—field system in which one—third of the land that was being cultivated was left fallow each year. The peasants in some places still had scattered strips. They had to spend a good deal of time walking from one strip to another. There was a great lack of livestock, which meant there was a lack of manure. There was a lack of nitrogen. This indicated a lack of leguminous plants which would restore the nitrogen content to the soil. There was only a small portion of the land cultivated; only 25 percent of the land of Russia was cultivated at the beginning of the century, compared with 40 percent in the rest of Europe.

The unit yields per acre were much smaller in Russia than in other places, places in the West. For example, they were about one—quarter of the unit yields of England and of Denmark, and about one—third of the unit yields of Eastern Germany; and one—half of the unit yields of France and other places.

There was a lack of equipment and the equipment they had was quite primitive. For instance, half of Russia’s peasants at the beginning of the century still used wooden plows; they still engaged in hand sowing; they still harvested with a sickle, and threshed with a flail by beating out the grain—very primitive methods. Many of the peasants had inadequate areas. One-sixth of the peasants had less than 10 acres, and that meant that one-sixth of the peasants had only about 4 percent of the land; and these peasants who had inadequate land had to find work else-where.

As a result of this there was a great deal of rural underemployment—I wouldn’t say rural unemployment—they were busy part of the time—but there was a good part of the time when most of the Russian peasants were not doing very much.

There was a great population pressure on the land. For example, the number of persons per square mile was about twice what it was in the United States at the beginning of this century. The are of the land cultivated per person on the land was about 3 acres for each person—3 acres, compared to 13 in the United States, and 8 in Denmark.

That agricultural system obviously was primitive. It has been estimated that the number of underemployed and unemployed people in rural areas in Russia must be counted in millions at the beginning of the century. Estimates ran them over a long range sometimes from 5 million up.

Commercial relationships at the beginning of the century were poor. They had very poor roads and a poor road system. The roads we dusty, first tracks for much of the year, and completely impassable for certain periods of the year. For instance, in the spring they were just mud holes—you couldn’t get through at all. The river system was very helpful, but most of it was frozen up for a good part of the year; and the rest of it led to places to which no one really wanted to go. For instance, all the Asiatic rivers led to the Artic Ocean.

The railroads had been built only after 1890—there had been a few before. These railroads were designed to take crops from the agricultural areas and export them; so they ran to the seaports, and to a certain extent they ran to the northwestern part of Russia, where the big cities were; but they were designed to drain food from the countryside.

Industry was inadequate at the beginning of this century, as you know. It was very largely based upon the railroads. Thus, it was to be found in metals, coal, and petroleum; but because it had come into Russia so late, the Russian industry was very large scale. Five percent of all the factories had more than 50 percent of all the workers in industry. But, while the factories were large, they were not what we can call modern, because the amount of power available to a worker in such a factory was very inadequate. The horsepower in Russian industry was 1.6 horsepower per hundred workers, compared with 24 in England at the beginning of the century, or 13 in Germany.

So the Russian past history, economically, was backward. It was also exploitative. That is to say, the food, as I have indicated, was drained from the rural areas and exported, or was used to support a rather small upper class. There is no objection to a small exploitative economy—don’t think I am appealing for social justice; I am not. An exploitative economy is necessary, and is justified only if the surplus gathered together is being used for some productive purpose, notably, for capital investment. But this was being done in prerevolutionary Russia to a rather low degree. There was a low standard of living, generally: excess export of consumers’ goods; top-heavy consumption, in the sense that a very small group at the top consumed a rather large portion of the total consumption; a top-heavy state bureaucracy, and a large number of Russians living abroad in leisure.

The drain resulted, of course, from unequitable ownership; from legal claims; from differential taxes which were designed to reduce the consumption of the lower classes; from differential freight rates and price differentials. For example, the grain which traveled large distances to the seaports traveled at a lower freight rate than short-run rates which would take food, for instance, to the next town. As a result, much of the materials which we would expect to have been used in Russia were exported.

Russia had 19.5 pounds of sugar per capita per year as its consumption in 1900, compared with 92 pounds per person per year in England—you have 19.5 to 92 between Russia and England. One-fourth of Russia’s sugar crop was exported and it was sold in London. The Russian sugar was sold in London at 40 percent less than the price for which it was sold in Russia. Similarly with cotton consumption—about five pounds of cotton per capita in Russia; 39 pounds in England; but note, a very considerable part of the Russian cotton crop was exported, mostly to China and India.

Russia produced almost half of the world’s petroleum in 1900 and exported much of it. The consumption in Russia of kerosene, which the Russians needed, was very low; 60 percent of their kerosene was exported. The consumption of petroleum in Russia was 12 pounds per person in 1900, compared with 42 pounds per person in Germany.

Of the exports in Russia, 50 to 75 percent were rural products; 40 percent were cereal grains; which shows quite clearly that it was a drain from the countryside and was being exported. As a result of this, the official investigation in 1895 in 46 provinces of European Russia showed that more than half the peasants lacked a minimum of bread and only 20 percent of them had what was regarded by the government at that time as an adequate supply of bread.

That is the second point in the past history of Russia. The first was that it was backward; the second was that it was exploitative. The third I will merely give a sentence on—it was dominated. To give you an example: Railroads were built largely at state expense; 74 percent of its capital was owned by the state. All the land in Siberia, with minor exceptions, was owned by the state. People who worked on it or lived on it were living on it with use only, not with ownership.

The third factor which influenced what happened afterwards was economic realities. I will not say much about that. You know you must have resources, materials, knowledge, labor, power, and you must have organization of these if you are going to produce anything. Naturally, the Bolsheviks discovered that after they came in.

The fourth factor which influenced their behavior was what I call external pressures, real or imaginary, that gave rise to a need for defense. Inevitably such a need for defense drew resources from capital investments and from consumption. This threefold appeal for the resources of Russia such as manpower, materials, energy, knowledge, and so forth—whether those resources should be used for consumption, capital investment, or defense, that has been the basic problem of the Bolshevik economy from the beginning and remains so today.

Now, those four factors gave certain results over the period after 1917, and those results I am going to divide into four periods. The first period, relatively brief, covers from November 1917 to June 1918. I will call that “consolidating power.” The second period is called “the period of war communism”—from June 1918 to March 1921. The third period is called “the period of the new economic policy” (the NEP), and that ran approximately from March 1921 to October 1928. The fourth period is “the plan era.” That is the period of the five Five-Year Plans, and that ran from October 1928 to the present. We are now in the third year of the fifth Five-Year plan.

I am going to discuss those four periods in order, beginning with the first—consolidating power. The Czarist government fell from power early in 1917 because of external pressures and not because of internal pressures. It was destroyed by the German attach and the success of the German attack. As you know, when it fell from power, it was succeeded by what was supposed to be a parliamentary government, a coalition government of diverse parties of the more or less moderately left the Kerensky government as it was called. That Kerensky government attempted to continue certain policies of the Czarist government. For example, they attempted to continue with the war against Germany, and second, they attempted to continue with the existing agrarian structure; that is, land owned and the products of the land distributed approximately as they had been before.

Making use of these two tactical errors of the Kerensky government, the small minority of Bolsheviks were able to come to power in November 1917. They did it by offering peach and land—peach with Germany, ending the war, which most people wanted, and land to the peasants. Since many of the soldiers were peasants, this offer of peace and land created a tremendous appeal for the Bolshevists, an appeal that was not based on the Marxist ideology, was not based on the hope of a future Communist state at all, but merely upon this immediate aim—peace and land.

Accordingly, the Bolsheviks came to power and they came to power in a situation for which their ideology did not equip them. The Marxist ideology had said that there would be an inevitable revolution when the rich got fewer and fewer in numbers and the poor got more and more numerous and that it would occur at a very late stage in a fully industrialized society. Here was Russia with a Bolshevik government presumably in control, which did not have a fully industrialized society, and as a result it did not have a proletariat on which to base its support, and it did not have a highly industrialized capital equipment that would make it a powerful state and a productive state. Accordingly, as the Bolsheviks came to power, they were faced with what seemed to them an almost insoluble problem: Howe were they going to get the fully industrialized state which alone could permit a Communist society to function?

The solution to that, according to Lenin, would be a long period of state capitalism. What he envisioned apparently was a proletariat dictatorship of Bolsheviks, that, since the proletariat were not yet there, the Bolsheviks would take over and would more or less hold control of the state during an extended period in which capitalism would be allowed to develop and would build up the industrialized society which they expected and, of course, which they needed. During that period the small group at the top, which was merely holding the wheel, so to speak, until they were ready to start steering, would do what it could to promote state capitalism and to develop and industrialize society, and would prevent any actions which ultimately would prevent establishing a really Communist state.

Now, before any of this could be done, it seemed clear to Lenin that he had to get support. Since he didn’t have proletariat support, where would he get it? The answer was, from the peasants, and accordingly he brought forth the idea that there must be a close alliance between the peasants and the workers. The soldiers presumably were made up of workers and peasants. Political control was the real issue of the first eight or nine months of the regime, from November 1917 to June 1918—consolidation of power, without any attention, really, to ultimate communism or ultimate Communist conditions, and with little attention indeed to ultimate economic power.

In order to obtain the alliance which they needed, they continued to repeat the peach and land slogans which had brought them to power. By a land decree of November 1917, the government and local governmental units took over the ownership of all land—presumably to be used by the peasants. The gran trade was nationalized. Peace was made in March 1918 with Germany, on very severe terms, but at least it gave peace. Progressive labor legislation was installed to win the workers, with an eight-hour day, no work for anyone under 16 years of age, no night work for females, paid vacations, sickness and unemployment insurance. It looked marvelous. The only trouble was they didn’t have an economic system to support any such legislation and practically none of it went into effect.

But the workers took time off and relaxed and, as a result of this, and as a result of sabotage from the management, and as a result of a whole lot of different things, there was a tremendous fall in production. The undisciplined of the workers, sabotage by the owners, and finally, foreign invasion, brought an acute crisis.

It is quite clear in that early period that the chief aim was merely to get power and somehow hold it; and that in their attempts to get that aim and to achieve it they sacrificed a great deal of economic realities, and as a result destroyed economic production. The crisis to which I have referred, caused by the undisciplined of the workers, sabotage by the owners, and above all by the civil war and the invasion of foreign countries, led to the next state, stage two: the period of war communism which lasted from June 1918 to March 1921.

In June 1918 a decree of general nationalization was passed. It took over all enterprises with over a 400,000-dollar capital in industry; 37,000 firms were taken over in this way; all private trade was forbidden; presumably everything that was produced was to go to the state and the state would distribute products where it would be necessary.

In 1920 all factories with more than 5 workers using power, and all factories with more than 10 workers not using power, were nationalized. Compulsory requisitioning of agricultural products was established; that is, the government seized from the producers, the peasants and the farmers, all except a fixed minimum. This grain was then bartered for industrial products. The grain was taken and distributed to the factories; their goods were taken and distributed to the farmers. Rationing and price fixing were established. This is the period of war communism.

The results of the period were approximately as follows: In the first place, there was tremendous dissatisfaction due to the civil war. A very considerable fraction of productive resources, especially agricultural resources, were destroyed. The railroads were largely destroyed. The number of locomotives on hand fell from 14,500 at the end of 1917 to 4,000 at the beginning of 1920; that is in approximately two years they fell 10,500. Industrial production fell by 1920 to one-seventh of the industrial production of 1913. Starvation and disease were everywhere. People fled from the towns. Most towns lost between one-quarter and one-third of their population. Moscow lost one-half of its population. The peasants went on strike. Since all that they produced above a fixed minimum was being taken by the government, they were quite prepared to follow their production to fall to that minimum. Great areas went out of cultivation. In 1920 only half as much land was sown as had been sown in 1913. In certain areas as in the Volga and the Caucasus, only one-quarter as much was planted in 1920 as had been planted seven years previous, in 1913. The total harvest of 1920 was probably less than 40 percent of the prewar harvest.

Now, in order to collect the grain which the government was demanding, soldiers had to be sent out. There were armed classes between soldiers and peasants. Government agents who went out to supervise this were murdered in the night. There was a 100-percent inflation in prices in three years. There was a bureaucratic breakdown. No one knew who was doing what. Generally, there were seven people delegated not to do each job. It is estimated that by July 1920 one-quarter of the population of Petrograd—Leningrad now—were bureaucrats—officials of the government. That sounds familiar, doesn’t it?

The government clearly was losing the support of the peasants and even of some of the workers, because the workers also were starving. It became quite clear that a change must be made. But such a change could be made only after the civil war was more or less finished and after the foreign invaders had withdrawn. That was accomplished at the beginning of 1921.

The new policy which was adopted is the famous NEP, the new economic policy. This new economic policy was established at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921. The purpose of the NEP was both political and economic. Politically, it sought to restore the alliance between the peasants and the workers. Economically it sought to restore production. The method by which this was done was to restore very largely a free economy. Agriculture was freed almost completely. This was done by reversing the demands upon the farmer. Prior to this they had given a minimum t the farmer and all above that was to go to the state. Now they established a fixed amount to go to the state and all above that would go to the farmer.

There was a tax in kind in place of the previous requisitioning. This tax in kind was to yield about one-half of the previous requisitions, and it was estimated this would provide a minimum food allotment for the army and for the workers in the most essential industries. All the surplus above that tax was left to the peasant and he could trade it as he wished. This would encourage more sowing and better production, that is, in agriculture.

Practically all commerce was free. Rationing, of course, had to be continued. As a result of this there grew up a character who was known in Russian history as the NEP man. The NEP men were those who every morning hastily got out with a large bag and went out into the country with some things they could get from the city—industrial items or tools, or almost anything they could lay their hands on. They went out in the country and swapped these items with the peasants for various kinds of food which they brought back into the city.

Banking was not free. Banking and finance were left in government hands. However, inflation was curtailed by devaluating the paper ruble to one million, so that one million of the old rubles equaled one of the new rubles, and this new ruble was stabilized in 1924.

Agriculture was thus freed, commerce was almost entirely free, banking and finance were not free at all. Industry was missed. First, heavy industry was left under state control, on the state budget. Second, all other industry was organized into about 500 cartels which were called trusts. These were financially autonomous. It was expected they would buy in the market and sell in the market, pay their own way and, by their sales, hope to cover their costs. These cartels were made legal persons in law.

The managers of the factories that made up the cartels had freedom in regard to the production in their own factory, but they had no control over buying and selling. That was done by the cartel to which they belonged.

The third portion of industry was small units which were left completely free. So they had state ownership which continued for heavy industry; an autonomous monopolized structure for most industry; and then freedom for the smaller, less important industry. The result of this—the NEP men. This private trade handled about one-half of all retail trade and about one-fourth of the wholesale trade; but these fractions declined steadily during the period 1923 to 1928. Another result was the recovery from the terrible crisis, the two famines of 1921 and 1922.

Because they now had a competitive agricultural system and a cartelized monopolistic industrial system, they had the problem of price parities, which we have heard so much about in this country. That is to say, agricultural prices fluctuated much more widely than did the monopolistic industrial prices. This had two stages in it—the first state, early in 1922 and early in 1923, is called the sales crisis; the second stage, in 1923 and after, is called the scissors.

The sales crisis arose when the monopolized new trusts which controlled industry tried to get working capital by liquidating the products they had at hand as rapidly as possible, that is, by selling. They sold the products they had at had to get cash and capital for working purposes. This meant that they were competing with each other. It meant they were selling at any price so they could get the money; the prices of industrial products fell drastically. This was economically completely unjustified. The shortage of industrial products would not have warranted falling prices. This meant the peasants were in an advantageous position. Agricultural prices, because of the shortage of food, were high; industrial prices were temporarily very low. That is called the sales crisis.

As soon as the system got organized in the following year—1923, the scissors took over and the situation reversed. That meant that as agricultural production increased, agricultural prices tended to fall, since they were competitive; but the industries, having a monopolistic system, as soon as they got the cash they wanted, were able to function arbitrarily, and they raised their prices in order to recapture some of the losses they had made in the preceding sales crisis. This gave rise to a parity problem and, once again, discontent of the peasants.

The new economic policy lasted for many years. During those years they were facing certain basic problems, the real basic problem being a political one, which was that: Is it possible over a long-term period to build up a Communist system in one country. The left Communist, led by Trotsky, said it wasn’t. They said, “We must have a world revolution. If we do we won’t have to worry about defense; we will have a lot of people on our side. We won’t have to worry about industrial capital; we will have the German industrial system to supply us with machinery and capital.”

The other group, the group that ultimately triumphed, led by Stalin, said “Socialism in one country is necessary.” It became clear that they could not get a Communist regime in Germany, which was the turning point. If they couldn’t have the world revolution, they would have to have socialism in a single country. If you have socialism in a single country, it means you must get labor and capital internally—this meant from peasants. People had to be drawn in from the country, and the peasants once again had to be exploited by having a considerable fraction of what they produced take away and used to build up industrial machinery or to feed the laborers in the city. This meant that the worker-peasants alliance once again inevitably had to be broken. If they imported machinery, the same position would be faced. They would have to draw food or other goods from the country and export them to pay for the machinery; so the problem remained the same.

The decision which was ultimately made was to exploit the peasants and build up a heavy industrial system. The decision was made to emphasize heavy industry rather than light industry, because heavy industry would give them future production rather than immediate consumption, because heavy machinery would make them stronger in the future, because they admired the American methods, and above all, because heavy industry would strengthen them for defense.

Now we will follow a sequence. First, the failure of the German revolution made socialism in one country inevitable. This made an acute need for defense. This made an emphasis on heavy industry rather than on light industry which might have been used to raise conditions and the standards of living. Emphasis on heavy industry made by any immediate returns to the peasants for their food and manpower impossible both the food and the manpower had to be sucked into the towns. This gave rise to the danger of a peasants’ production strike such as had occurred previously. This danger of a peasants’ production strike made it necessary to destroy the freedom of the peasants to strike or to reduce their production.

This made necessary a ruthless dictatorship, the end of all pretense of democracy, the establishment of a one-party system which exploited both peasants and workers alike. Accordingly, the first step toward this end was the Five-Year Plan--the first Five-Year Plan, 1928. Now, incidentally, it is not worthwhile, because the time is running so short, to give you the details of those Five-Year Plans, except to say there were five of them and the first began in 1928. The first one, however, was finished in four years and two months; so that took it to December 1932. Since then they have run in calendar years. So the second Five-Year Plan was January 1933 to December 1937. The third Five-Year Plan was interrupted by the war; the fourth Five-Year Plan began in 1945; and the fifth Five-Year Plan began in 1951.

The first step in the first Five-Year Plan thus was to reduce the peasants. Accordingly, 20 million farms were ruthlessly forced to join together to form about 250,000 large-scale units. Of those, more than 200,000 were collective farms run on a cooperative basis, and paying large portions of their production of the state. The other 50,000 or less were run directly by the state.

These efforts to collectivize agriculture led to an acute famine. The reason was that when the peasants were forced into the collective units, rather than take their goods and, above all, their livestock and hand them over to a collective unit, they killed them and ate them. So the livestock were killed off by the peasants. In retaliation for this and to be disciplined, the peasants were ruthlessly starved to death. The goods they had produced and had reserved were taken away from them and were taken to the towns. The result was the tremendous famine of 1932 in which perhaps a million starved.

In order to continue this exploitation of the peasants, price differentials were established for different kinds of goods and a very substantial sales tax was put on goods. It has been estimated by one student that from 1927 to 1948 consumer prices were allowed to go up thirtyfold--the prices of consumers’ goods went up thirtyfold, so they had to pay to get them. Wages went up elevenfold. Those together would reduce consumption. Capital goods, producers’ goods, and armaments went up in all about twofold or threefold. Thus, the government would take agricultural products from the farmer at low prices, sell them at high prices, take the difference and use it to industrialize--use it to pay for the building up of factories and armaments. Moreover, a sales tax was put on most goods that were purchased and that sales tax varied between 50 and 80 percent--it was generally about 60 percent. This also kept down consumption, because people’s incomes were used up. Rationing for most goods continued for the early part of the Five-Year Plans. In fact rationing was continued, except from 1936 to 1941, and since December 1947, when rationing was about at a minimum.

In addition to this, people who didn't believe they had enough could go and buy extra, but they had to buy in commercial stores, where prices were many times higher. This again used up purchasing power.

Now, that is the essence of the plan system. You will be more or less studying what the plan system produced in the rest of this course.

Let me sum up the four factors that determined what happened: The ideology from Marx, which certainly didn’t fit the situation at all; the past history of Russia--it was so backward; the realities of economic existence; and the external pressures--the necessity for defense.

Those four factors, playing against each other in different proportions at different times, gave rise to four successive periods: The first period, in which they were doing anything to get in power that lasted for about eight months; the second period of war communism, which lasted for about three years and which ended when the civil war ended, in 1921; the third period of the new economic policy, or the period, if you wish, of state capitalism, which lasted for about seven years; and then the last period, which has lasted since October 1928, the plan era, in which there has been a ruthless exploitation of the peasants and a very considerable exploitation of industrial labor in order to build up both capital equipment in industry and armaments for defense.

I thank you, gentlemen.

Thursday, February 13, 2020

RAMBO III (RE-MASTERED)

http://store.intrada.com/s.nl/it.A/id.11455/.f

Rambo III re-sequenced, re-mastered, re-packaged! After lengthy delay, third and final score by Jerry Goldsmith in initial Rambo trilogy finally brings Intrada CD series under one roof at the same time. John Rambo takes on Russians in Afghanistan in effort to rescue captured Colonel Trainman. Sylvester Stallone, Richard Crenna star, John Stainier photographs, Stallone & Sheldon Lettich script, Buzz Feitshans produces, Peter MacDonald directs. Jerry Goldsmith writes his longest Rambo score, infuses it with the largest number of thematic ideas as well. Melodies from first two films do appear but this time Goldsmith emphasizes all-new Rambo-in-action material with new rhythmic foundations as well. Also of note: Architectural device of new four-note building block that launches new theme. Motif not only anchors new Rambo theme but also opens other new material including music for Afghanistan locale plus beautiful minor-key theme underlining Rambo’s loyalty to new friends helping him in his cause. Capturing center stage none-the-less is dynamic action music wherein four-note motif in brass over familiar mixed-meter rhythms in left-hand digital piano literally propel Rambo into action. Goldsmith himself dubbed forte performance of piano overlays during mixing to create unusually commanding timbre. Post-production editing of the film created necessity to truncate numerous cues, replace others with tracks from second film. As such, CD for Rambo III features music not heard in final film. Highlights of score are numerous but standing tall is powerful ending sequence when Rambo parts with new friends, rides off in Jeep with Trautman. Here, Goldsmith returns to his very first “Homecoming” theme from movie that launched series, First Blood. As solo trumpet gives way to strings, entire orchestra crescendoes in powerful fortissimo farewell to this most emotional of Goldsmith themes. Entire following end credit music heard in same cue (“I’ll Stay”) offers magnificent medley of new action theme with haunting minor-key theme, culminating in stirring coda that melds both second and third film’s themes in single muscular flourish. Great finale to the trilogy! Intrada presents entire score from first generation three-track masters mixed by Mike Ross-Trevor from his original Otari 32-track digital scoring session elements. Previous releases were produced from two-track session DATs. New mastering adds weight, clarity. Score also now presented for the first time in film sequence. New liner notes focusing on thematic ideas plus revised packaging from Kay Marshall complete this definitive look at a genuine Goldsmith action classic! “The first time was for himself. The second was for his country. This time is for his friend.” Arthur Morton, Nancy Beach orchestrate, Jerry Goldsmith composes, conducts Hungarian State Opera Orchestra.